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We have developed a new threat model for plausibly deniable storage, designed a system to counter
the adversary described in the threat model, and experimentally evaluated both our design and long-held assumptions integral to previous systems. We have designed and implemented Artifice, a deniable storage system where hidden data blocks are split with an information dispersal algorithm to produce a set of obfuscated carrier blocks that are indistinguishable from other random blocks on the disk. The blocks are then stored in unallocated space, possess a self-repair capability, and rely on combinatorial security. We have evaluated the reliability and effectiveness of this approach in protecting the integrity of a hidden volume through theoretical models and empirical evaluation. Unlike existing and proposed systems, Artifice addresses problems regarding flash storage devices and multiple snapshot attacks through comparatively simple block allocation schemes and operational security. To hide the user's ability to run a deniable system and prevent information leakage, Artifice stores its driver software separately from the hidden data.